WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PHYSICAL EXPERIMENT?

Abstract

The article deals with the fact that in the philosophy of science it is considered that  the compliance with a fact is not only necessary, but also sufficient for the acceptance of a scientific theory, because scientific theories are just a collection of data, moreover, their classifications and weak extrapolations.

And if theoretical foresight comes into conflict with some empirical facts, then all the blame falls on the theory, and without any appeal, because the supreme authority is experiment. This point of view is not true methodologically and philosophically, as well as historically. Since the above task will be based on the content of historiosophical determinants, we will proceed to outline the internal connections of theory and experience, without rejecting the advantages of one of these poles.

Each content line of a scientific theory is related to research and experimental work in at least three ways: verification of the existing theoretical facts under the real-existing reality, which is realized through the involvement of research tools (observation, measurement, and processing of results); involvement in the process of planning and further interpretation of data obtained in the process of observations, measurements, or experiments; application of available theoretical potential for practical purposes in such a way as to achieve certain changes regarding the previous state.

To reveal the historiosophical depth of the above trio, it is necessary to reflect the significance of the first two cases through the prism of general methodological provisions, without resorting to the technical details of statistical conclusions and experimental ideas of the average researcher.

Given such a range of activity variations, we can conclude that our theoretical prediction can directly “come into conflict” with fragmentary empirical facts. In this case, the representatives of prominent scientific circles are sure to accuse the unreliability and inadmissibility of the theory itself, and without the right to unsubstantiated appellate steps, as under such conditions, the only experience is the highest instance. The latter factuality is not justified today from both methodological and historiosophical points of view, which is proved by the list of the following facts. First, at the level of general physical practice, as a rule, facts that come into conflict with established theories are immediately rejected and do not fall under reflection.

Second, the pure facts themselves reliable data, as they are produced and interpreted by drawing on the scientific potential of existing theories.

Third, the vast majority of theories do not concern observations and measurements (not to mention in this case the facts of perception) of idealized models, but primarily real objects, which explains the proximity to real existence.

Fourth, hypothetical assumptions that can be tested often mostly crystallize theoretically at the level of the conjunction of theory and additional predictions, as well as a volumetric block of informative data that differ from each other and serve as an informal “equivalent” for testing the proposed theory.