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# MORAL EMOTIONS – PEDAGOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

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**Abstract**. The aim of the article is to identify the status of emotions in the processes of passing judgements and taking moral decisions as well as to indicate the importance of emotional competence in moral development. In the first part of the text, we review the concept of morality, with particular reference to the emotivism of Alfred J. Ayer, Alan Gibbard's emotivism, and trends in the ethics of care by Nel Noddings as viewpoints that emphasize the affective factor. In the second part, using the concept of social, related to self-awareness and moral emotions, we argue for the role of emotions in the processes possessing moral significance. On that basis, we cautiously assume that people who have developed high emotional competence are also more morally competent. The last part is the search for pedagogical implications and justification of the thesis about the meaningful and functional relationship of emotional and moral development in the processes of upbringing. Since ethics concerns how we should live and since these areas are so much concerned with how we live, moral education ought to focus on developing moral skills (virtues), thanks to which moral feelings will guide children and adolescents.

**Keywords***: emotions, emotional competence, moral emotions, moral education.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Taking into account the theses of neuroethics regarding the participation of emotions in the formulation of moral assessments and the rapid increase in knowledge about what emotions are, what types of emotions exist and what importance emotions have, the intention was made to look at the emotions that accompany moral decisions and actions in the article. The aim of the article is to analyse what moral emotions are and what their importance is. We will also consistently refer to the concept of morality – here, however, we would like to make a reservation - morality is of secondary interest to me, only in the conceptual framework of moral emotions. We also intend to search for the implications of the participation of emotions in the process of assessment and moral action for the theory and practice of upbringing.

The article is of theoretical nature and consists of three parts. In the first part, we review the most commonly applied theories of morality, taking into account the categories of feelings, emotions and intuition. The second part is intended to lead to conceptualising the concept of moral emotions and to indicate their importance in moral assessment and action. The concluding part focuses on recommendations for the practice of moral education, which take into account emotional competences often omitted in formal education.

## 2. "COLD" AND "HOT" THEORIES OF MORALITY – A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

The search for factors being of importance for moral action is the subject of research by philosophers,

psychologists, sociologists and educators. In the classical concepts of morality, it was assumed that the formulation of assessments and making moral decisions is guided mainly by rational and conscious processes, and moral competence consists in assessing an event, taking into account a set of abstract values and moral norms, and in relating them to a specific situation (Spinoza 1677/2006; Kant 1785/2009; Mill 1863/2006). Similarly, cognitive development psychologists (Gibb, 1992; Kohlberg & Mayer, 2001; Piaget 1932/1967; Rest, 1980) attribute importance being of fundamental for moral behaviours to cognitive motivation and moral reasoning – moral assessment is recognised as universal, objective and independent of subjective experiences. Nowadays, in science in general, there is a turn towards the soft aspects of human functioning – towards emotions, intuition and subjective experiences. Theoretical constructs such as emotional intelligence, emotional culture, emotional competence, etc. as well as the moral emotions being of interest in this paper are a clear symptom of this turn. Reflections on moral emotions are conducted at the intersection of contemporary philosophical ethics (Sommers-Flanagan & Sommers-Flanagan, 2007) and theological ethics (Browning, 2006), moral psychology (Haidt, 2001, 2007), cognitive neuroscience (Churchland, 1996), positive psychology (Emmons, 1999) and the psychology of religion (Paloutizian & Park, 2005). The belief that people are endowed with a repertoire of emotions with a strong moral content is not new. They were termed moral feelings by Adam Smith (Smith, 1759/1989). Psychoanalysts (cf. Freud, 1984) and supporters of the theory of social learning (cf. Bandura & Walters, 1963) pointed to the role of emotions in inhibiting antisocial behaviours and generating pro-social activities. However, this idea remained beyond the scope of empirical research until the 1980s. One of the first elaborate theories radically elevating the role of emotions in the processes of judgement and moral action is emotivism.

When, in the 1930s, the existence of ethical norms as truth claims was questioned and their function limited to expressing emotions, the adjective "emotive" was used for the first time in relation to concepts in the field of ethics. A classical presentation of the theory of emotivism can be found in the works of Alfred J. Ayer, according to which in everyday language ethical concepts and statements serve only to express our attitudes towards something and evoke similar feelings and desires in others, or behaviours in a certain way (1984). Ayer thus questioned the status of moral judgements as logical assertions. Since judgements do not express beliefs, but only subjective experiences, emotivism in his view is considered radical (1984, p. 34). The model of explaining and highlighting the importance of moral feelings as a key term in the language of morality is also developed by the theory of expressivism (cf. Kuźniar, 2020, p. 51). Alan Gibbard (2006, p. 195) proposes a broad understanding of morality (norms of rational action) and a narrow one (norms of moral feelings). Moral assertions result directly in assertions about the obligation to experience moral feelings (plans for moral feelings), while normative epistemological beliefs result in plans for these beliefs. Moral conviction is a belief in the obligation to feel certain moral feelings, Gibbard primarily includes the feeling of guilt and indignation among them (2006, pp. 200-210).

Moral feelings are key concepts of morality in the approach of Ayer and Gibbard. The difference indicated by the interpreters of emotivism and expressivism concerns the essence of moral feelings. In Ayer's case, moral claims express moral feelings, while in Gibbard's case, they express states of acceptance for the plans for these feelings (cf. Kuźniar, 2020, p. 57). Gibbard's concept actually explains only the cognitive aspect of moral discourse, as it treats feelings as a part anticipated in moral beliefs. On the other hand, in Ayer's concept of ethical statements, emotions play a descriptive function and precisely because he attributes emotions a fundamental role in the process of moral judgement, his concept is often criticised (Gibbard, 2006). In the psychology of morality and in philosophy, the emotional turn is reflected in undermining the universalist ethics of justice (Kohlberg, 1981) and arguing for an emotive ethics of care (Gilligan, 1982). The difference in these orientations is revealed at the theoretical level, as well as in the formulated psychology of morality and, beyond the cognitive-emotional dichotomy, it is expressed in the difference between the universal and the individual (Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1988). The ethics of care, unlike the ethics of justice, does not disregard the individual characteristics, emotions and identity of the subject, which affects the model of interpersonal

relationships. A "specific" one is different, not a "generalised" one; it has its history, needs and motivation, which must be understood in order to assess and act in accordance with values (Benhabib, 1986, pp. 82-86). Benhabib (1986, pp. 91-95) points out that in the ethics of care, norms are actually much more demanding than those related to the universalist perspective: beyond rights and duties, care, compassion and responsibility are the most important ones. In these feelings, cold judgement and rational judgement from a distance are not sufficient, it is necessary to engage in and experience the emotions of another person. Nel Noddings goes a step further and perceives the source of moral evil in the perception of oneself and others as symbols, representatives of a group or idea. According to the philosopher, replacing emotions with abstract moral considerations inevitably leads to objectification (1988). Noddings notes that framing moral dilemmas in relation to the rational aspect, while shifting them from the level of an individual problem to the level of abstraction, is a strategy with a long tradition in ethical thought. She points out that it was initiated by Aristotle, who, despite considering pity as a kind of passion, raised the issue of the right to pity. This means that for Aristotle, emotions, for example pity or anger, are subjected to "regulations" having their source in reason. According to Noddings, rationalisation and the tendency to generalize, i.e., to abstract from individual circumstances – make us disallow ourselves to be empathetic, and this maintains the tendency to inflict suffering in us (1988, pp. 216-220).

Although emotive and expressivist models are criticized, also due to the weakness of the logical justifications for the theses (cf. Kuźniar, 2020), are a position balancing cognitive aspects and a clear symptom of a turn towards emotional, intuitive aspects of moral functioning.

Nowadays, many researchers pay attention to the emotional aspects of morality and moral development, thus referring to the concept of Aristotle's virtue, morality as a product of feelings by David Hume or Adam Smith's moral feelings (cf. Gilligan, 2003). The role of feelings, emotions and intuition is described, among others, by Martin L. Hoffman, who draws attention to empathy as the ability to share the perspective of other people and thus as a motivator of pro-social thinking and action (Hoffman, 2006, p. 28). The views expressed by Jesse Prinz, who in his lectures presents two radical hypotheses about the nature of morality and emotions, also adhere to this trend. According to the philosopher, morality has an emotional foundation, and moral values are based on emotional reactions which are instilled by culture and are not conditioned by natural selection. Therefore, moral facts depend on emotional reactions, and these are determined by culture. He presents his views on the emotional essence of morality in two emotionist theses describing the role of emotions in the processes of evaluation and moral action (Prinz, 2007, p. 92). The first is the so-called metaphysical emotionism, which indicates that the identification of a person's moral skills/properties must be made with reference to an emotion or group of emotions. The other one, in turn, epistemic emotionism assumes that moral theory is related to emotions, in order to describe a moral theory/concept, one must first experience an emotional episode, go through it and link the situation with emotions. We find confirmation in everyday experience: when assessing violence against children we feel disgust, saying that the war is evil we feel outrage at Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

Jonathan Haidt, a moral psychologist (2001) views the relationship between morality and emotionality in a similar manner. As an alternative to rationalist models of morality, he proposed the Social-Intuitionist Model (SIM) of moral judgement, which shows the essence of morality in practice. People, in a situation of moral evaluation and moral decision, behave – according to Haidt – more like "good lawyers" trying to convince others than "impartial judges" looking for objective truth (Haidt, 2001, p. 218). The intuitive aspect of Haidt's model refers to the source of moral judgement found in automatic affective reactions, rather than moral reasoning, which is a post-hoc process of seeking evidence to support one's initial intuitive reactions. In turn, the second aspect of SIM refers to the social context of moral judgement, because assessment is not only a private act of cognition, but a social process, conditioned by cultural experiences and acquired norms (Haidt, 2007).

SIM, as Haidt and co-workers clearly point out, is not intended to highlight the difference between

emotions and cognition, but to indicate the interaction between these two ways of valuing - conscious moral discussion and intuitive (tacit) processes (so-called ones evaluating feelings), which are "amplified" by moral emotions (pro-social motivators) and virtues, i.e., social skills. The theoretical goal of Haidt's efforts is to shift the origins of moral reasoning from the so-called "cold" to "hot" ways of assessing and distinguishing a group of complex emotions participating in these processes, which will be discussed in the following paragraphs of the article (Haidt, 2007).

There is a growing interest in the role of emotions in the process of evaluation and moral decision-making, which is justified by the broadening of knowledge about emotions as experiences and also post-cognitive states, which are a kind of information about the situation of a person and his or her environment. Nowadays, the philosophical theses of the supporters of intuitive and automatic moral reactions are being verified by neurological and biological research on the brain (cf. Damasio, 2005; Le Doux, 2000), we also know much more about the role of emotions in thinking, acting and making decisions. In the light of the wealth of knowledge on the essence of emotional processes and their influence on motivation, cognitive and social functioning, one can hardly agree with the thesis that emotions cannot be discursive and cannot carry cognitive content – and such are the arguments used by the supporters of the rational explanation of moral decisions in order to undermine the role of emotions in the processes of passing judgements. Neuroethicians point to the specific areas of the brain activated in the process of moral evaluation and decision-making, which can be noticed in brain imaging studies. Among others, the research by Antonio Damasio (2005) on "acquired sociopathy" shows that without emotions, we become unable to assess (feel) the rightfulness or wrongfulness of even simple decisions, while the decisions made without taking emotions into account are not more ethical. Having analysed collected data, Damasio concludes that "cold" reasoning processes require affective ("hot") mechanisms, e.g., moral emotions (2005a, p. 37-46). Other empirical studies confirm the interactive relationships between feelings, reasoning and moral behaviour, which is why the latter seems to have both cognitive and emotional determinants (Rest, 1980; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Trempała & Czyżowska, 2003). Increasingly often, emotions are included in the concepts instituting order in moral processes. Including emotions in the process of evaluation and moral action, of course, has implications for the theory and practice of upbringing, which will be discussed in the last part of the text.

## 3. MORAL EMOTIONS – WHAT ARE THEY, WHAT ARE THE TYPES OF EMOTIONS AND HOW DO THEY PARTICIPATE IN MORAL PROCESSES?

Contemporary psychology ascribes the status of socially construed, constructive and cognitively conditioned processes to emotions (cf. Ekman, 1999; Lazarus, 1999). From the point of view of the essence and role of moral emotions, it is interesting to note their relational character and valuing processes present in the process of incitement and duration of emotions. Richard Lazarus argues that each emotion expresses a kind of relational meaning. Essential factors that precede emotions are related, on the one hand, to the individual, and on the other, to the environment, and these are the personality variables, the structure of "self" and the hierarchy of individual goals (1999, p. 304). Among other things, self-esteem, moral values, ideals, perception of other people and their well-being are the factors influencing the process of cognitive assessment and the emergence of emotions. Taking into account personal goals and the possibility of achieving them in a specific situation: "Each emotion results from the assessment of a specific profit or loss that has already arisen or will arise from the transaction of the individual with the environment and depends on the relational meaning constructed by the person" (Lazarus, 1999, p. 306).

Despite the fact that the incitement of every emotion involves cognitive processes assessing the possibility of achieving one's own needs, goals and values, not every emotion can be termed a moral one. We cannot call so emotions which are automatic and represent little cognitive content. In their independent concepts, Paul Ekman (1999) and Robert Plutchik (after Panksepp, 2005) call them basic or

universal emotions. Automatic emotions result from people's own needs, are reactive and bring about a state of readiness. Moral emotions differ from basic emotions in that they are related to caring for other people and relationships with them. In this sense, moral emotions belong to a wider class of social emotions, which refer to one's own "self" in a peculiar way and come from cognitive assessments of various aspects of reality, especially transactions with the environment important from the point of view of personal ideals (e.g., shame) and moral values (e.g., guilt).

Damasio points to an autonomous group of social emotions which accompany moral behaviour (2005, pp. 141–162; Fredrickson, 2004). Jaak Panksepp (2005, p. 193) suggests a taxonomy of emotions in which he introduces a class of higher core feelings, such as shame, guilt, contempt, sense of humour, empathy, compassion. Complex emotions can be aroused by thought processes relating to the sense of one's own "self", and this type of emotions is called self-conscious emotions (Lewis, 2005, p. 787; Tracy, Robins & Sherman, 2007). The above terms come from various theoretical concepts, but what the above-mentioned group of experiences holds in common is that they are post-cognitive (they appear as a result of the thought process) and reflective. Feeling these emotions means the need to activate specific standards of the Self and compare the current situation with the desired vision of the Self (Białecka-Pikul & Stępień-Nycz, 2011).

Increasingly, psychology speaks of moral emotions (Haidt, 2003; Moll, 2007, pp. 15–16) or moral feelings, which are "[...] reactions that people experience in the face of their own moral transgressions, i.e., in situations of violation of the recognised standards of behaviour" (Strus & Śląski, 2007, p. 16). With regard to development, moral emotions, and more broadly – reflective ones, are the so-called late emotions, which appear at the higher stages of cognitive and personal development, because they are triggered by complex cognitive processes, such as self-esteem and self-reflection. In the assessment of events, they include self-understanding, social context (assessment of other people) as well as the adopted value system (Tangney & Deaaring, 2002). Reflexive emotions, according to the cognitive-attributive theory, are post-cognitive, because they are preceded by an assessment of reality or its anticipated possible states (Lewis 2005, p. 784). Psychologists, neuroethicians and anthropologists include pride, embarrassment, humiliation and guilt in this group of emotions. These emotions have a social significance and are socially constructed.

The cognitive process leading to this type of emotions include the activation of norms which have been assimilated in the process of socialisation (upbringing), then the cognitive assessment of whether the state of Self and Beyond-Self match the patterns, and finally, the attributions associated with the Self, when the state of affairs is defined as more or less positive or negative, e.g. I have behaved well/badly and therefore I feel good/bad (Lewis, 2005, p. 787). Emotions based on self-awareness, as well as self-awareness itself, depend on the general cognitive level, willingness to reflect, ability to compare reality with norms, and thus also the knowledge of social norms (Ginger & Jarymowicz, 2011, p. 8). Finally, naming emotions and indicating the relationship with the situation and its consequences require the skills of verbalisation and communication. Therefore, reflective, complex, post-cognitive emotions are not given to us, but develop in the course of experience and are not automatic (Lewis, 2005, p. 795).

The cognitive assessment appearing in the attribution process may also concern general principles of what is good and what is bad, i.e., explicitly moral principles (Piaget, 1932/1967; Kohlberg, 1981). In addition to emotions related to internal standards of self-assessment (reference to superego constructions, ideal Self), emotions may appear in relation to the abstract concepts of good and evil (Białecka-Pikul & Stępień-Nycz, 2011). This way, in the process of judgement emotions allow us to transcend the egocentric perspective and to focus on other people, nature or animals. Shame, guilt, pride or self-acceptance appear as a result of the assessment of one's own Self, and the source of this assessment is the standard of Self (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Also, being touched, admiration, indignation at the violation of someone's freedom – have transgressive origins in relation to moral concepts (Lewis, 2005, p. 790).

The cognitive-attributional theory of emotions allows for analysing the relationship between

reflective emotions and judgements and actions regulated by moral norms. The model explicitly shows that the relationship between emotion and assessment is bidirectional (Czub & Brzezińska, 2013, pp. 27-30). In the case of basic (automatic) emotions, the incitement/emotional state affects the perception, assessment and decision-making without the control of the subject. The diffusiveness of emotions with an automatic origin means that the related assessment is holistic, homogeneous and also includes irrelevant elements, and information processing is biased (Imbir & Jarymowicz, 2011, p. 20). Such emotions, when not controlled, can disrupt perceptions, understanding of the situation and lead to misjudgements, being also capable of disturbing moral judgement (Ekman & Davidson, 1999). On the other hand, post-cognitive emotions are focused on the element assessed, the evaluation is heterogeneous, so that we can see the strengths and weaknesses of the phenomenon, the disadvantages and advantages of the person (Jarymowicz & Karwowska, 2003). Postcognitive emotions are appropriate in the process of formulating moral judgements and manifest themselves, among others, in the experiencing of moral dilemmas by people described as having high moral standards. Therefore, it can be cautiously assumed that people who have developed high emotional competence – who recognise complex emotional states, link them to specific situations and direct their behaviour – are also more morally competent, that is, their moral judgements are more accurate, and the decisions made comply with the adopted system of values (cf. Jarymowicz & Karwowska, 2003; Lewis, 2005).

### 3.1. Moral emotions as a guardian of

While there is still a lively debate about the role that moral emotions play in shaping moral judgments (Haidt, 2001; Hauser, 2006), their impact on moral action is generally agreed upon: "Emotions – argues Hauser – act as a well-designed motor engine that drives us in different directions depending on the task, influencing the perception of planned or perceived action" (2006, p. 188).

So, what is the place of emotions in the process of moral judgement? Generally, in this current of thought, it is assumed that the process of moral assessment in standard cases has a bottom-up nature, i.e., emotions are the beginning of a moral attitude and not its derivative. According to Jonathan Haidt, the essence of the relationship between emotions and morality is based on the role of emotional dispositions (2001, p. 3). Making reference to neurobiological research (cf. LeDoux, 2000, p. 48), emotions are not simply reactions to moral assessment, they accompany and sometimes precede issuance of a conscious moral assessment. Emotional intuitions – according to Haidt – appear automatically, while strategic reasoning and cognitive processing of the data about the situation may be secondary. In the standard case, a conscious moral assessment is probably a later stage (in the bottom-up process), initiated by an appropriate emotion (Prinz, 2007, p. 84). Simplifying, we will state after Haidt (2001, pp. 6-7) that we pass a moral judgement because we feel moral emotions, and not vice versa. At the same time, emotional moral assessments may lead to post hoc reasoning.

Jesse Prinz (2008), goes a step further in imparting importance to emotions in the process of emotional judgement and does not separate moral emotions from moral judgements, trying to prove that emotions are embodied judgements: "People's deepest moral values", Prinz argues, "especially when they act under pressure, are not based on arguments they have discovered when considering moral issues, but on deeply instilled feelings" (2007, p. 29). In a non-standard case, Prinz, like Haidt, does not exclude moral emotions of post factum type, when the moral assessment evokes moral emotions, and not vice versa (e.g., in the case of expressing a public assessment of a person's behaviour, we may feel that we have harmed a given person). Most often, however, emotions co-occur or influence moral judgements, and the intermediary factor is emotional skills (Prinz 2007), called moral virtues by Haidt (2001).

If we accept emotions in the process of moral judgement or otherwise the emotional dimensions of morality, we must assume that emotional competence is crucial for moral dispositions, in addition to knowledge and acceptance of moral standards (Prinz, 2007, p. 29). Amoral people are most often

accompanied by immaturity or emotional disorders.

Moral emotions are an integral concept of the SIM model discussed above, in which they are assigned the role of "the guardian of the moral world" (Shweder, 2007, p. 998), because they register automatic and unconscious cognitive assessments of events from the perspective of the well-being of oneself and others. When referring to moral emotions, Haidt means those emotional states that arise from moral situations and those that stimulate propensity to moral action (Haidt, 2003a). This means that certain emotions put us in a motivational and cognitive state in which there is an increased tendency to engage in (or inhibit) prosocial activities, an example may be empathy, which activates the tendency to take action and display altruism.

Thus, in Haidt's SIM (2007) and emotivism in Prinz's approach (2008), moral emotions perform an essential function of strengthening moral intuitions. Intuitive affective assessment triggers moral emotions that increase the likelihood of engaging in actual moral behaviour. The primacy of emotions as motivators of judgements and moral actions is, at least partially, confirmed in the studies on the social correlates of emotional competence. Evidence for the ubiquity of affective moral intuitions comes from interdisciplinary research. Here are some of the selected research results cited by Haidt (2001, 2007) confirming the role of emotions in moral judgement and moral action: affective reactions are usually good predictors of moral judgements and behaviours (Batson), and our moral preferences do not require inference (participation of cognitive processes) (Zajonc); moral action is more in harmony with moral emotions than with moral reasoning (Blasi); motives and emotions can be activated automatically, creating the dilemma of "double attitude" (Schultheiss); when we observe situations of violating moral norms, we react emotionally immediately – e.g. we are outraged (Luo et al.); emotional deficits can impair the processes of evaluation and moral decisions (Damasio). Haidt's view that only some principles are transparent for reflection, and in the case of some the situation is such that we can use them, but without fully realising their meaning is an interesting and important stance for the justification of the thesis about the emotional guardian of morality. If we are "morally bewildered" – we intuitively sense that something is wrong, even if we cannot explain why and verbalise the judgement (Haidt, 2001).

If the arguments of social psychologists in favour of the existence of moral emotions are considered debatable, one can refer to the data from neuroimaging studies and clinical cases. The participation of emotions, intuitions and automatic responses in moral assessment is confirmed, among others, by the studies described by Thalia Wheatley and Jonathan Haidt (2005), in which manipulating emotional reactions through hypnosis led to a change in moral judgement. Other studies have discovered the so-called Von Economo neuorons and the neuroanatomical region in the brain (right anterior insula) specialized for making quick, affect-weighted and intuitive judgements (we cite Wheatley, Haidt, 2005).

Other studies in the field of neuroethics point to the role of unconscious mechanisms of emotional nature in formulating assessments and making moral decisions (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2007; Changeux et al., 2005; Prinz, 2007; Tancredi, 2005). When performing cognitive tasks which are morally engaging (watching photos or videos with a moral overtone) or when making decisions in situations of moral dilemmas, areas in the brain directly or indirectly related to the emergence, processing of emotional incitement (e.g., Gazzaniga, 2005; Greene et al., 2004; Moll & de Oliveira-Souza, 2007). Prinz, guided by the results of brain imaging, claims that when we judge that something is good or bad, we simply express our emotions (2007). Brain activity or reporting one's own emotional experiences related to the assessed situation does not mean that emotions always facilitate moral cognition. In the psychology of morality, we will also find positions that are definitely critical of the thesis about the impact of emotions on moral cognition. Among other things, one of the most influential contemporary bioethicists – Peter Singer - believes that emotional assessments are not moral and are judgements similar to aesthetic ones. According to Singer, when being guided by emotions, we are not always able to capture the specific moral features of a situation (2011).

### 3.2. Typology of moral emotions

Taking into account the cognitive content of emotions, two types of moral emotions can be distinguished. Simple emotions with a narrow cognitive content, such as emotions based on the reflex of acceptance or rejection. It is the intuition of how to act that pushes us to act or repulse before we analyse the situation. They are called elementary – non-epistemic emotions (Haidt, 2006). It is different in the case of epistemic moral emotions (shame or gratitude) – the causes and effects of which are more readable for the subject and related to the social context. As self-aware emotions, they carry larger and more specific cognitive content – e.g. I am ashamed of a mistake, I am grateful to a specific person for their help (Lewis, 2005; Tangney & Deaaring, 2002).

Jorge Moll and Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza (2007, pp. 319-327) categorise moral emotions according to a broad definition of morality, which refers to the principles of proper behaviour and customs in everyday life and takes into account the subject being assessed and the direction of emotions:

1.   Self-conscious emotions are associated with self-esteem (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). They result from the awareness of other people's opinions about one's own behaviour and identity (Eisenberg, 2000):

1.   self-critical emotions (guilt, shame, embarrassment) when we have a sense of lowered social status or self-esteem,

2.   self-praising emotions (pride), associated with a sense of increased self-esteem and social rank (Fessler, 2001).

2.   Other-conscious emotions refer to others and the evaluation of their behaviour:

a.   "other-critical" (contempt/disgust/anger/indignation) motivate to punish others and sever social ties (Rozin et al., 1999)

b.   "other-praising" emotions (gratitude, admiration), emotions praising others drive positive reciprocity and cooperation.

c.   "other-suffering" emotions (pity, compassion, empathy) play a key role in helping and altruistic behaviours (Haidt, 2003).

Theoretically, moral emotions can be divided into categories, depending on the type of stimuli or conditions that trigger them (elicitors) and on specific tendencies to act (Haidt, 2003). However, emotions have a complex structure. There are subtle differences between them, and they are strongly related to the context and experiences of the person experiencing them (Fessler, 2004; Harris, 2003; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). What is experienced as a moral emotion is probably a structure composed of simple automatic emotions, emotional processes and cognitive processes. What we almost certainly know is that moral emotions motivate pro-social actions and moral judgement – they motivate us to pursue morally good behaviour. According to Robert Frank, assessing the situation from the perspective of values for oneself or others increases involvement in social relationships, besides, moral emotions have a strongly developed behavioural component (2004, p. 430). Even if social action does not take place, Haidt (2007) notes that the emotion felt puts the person in a state of readiness for actions directed at others, for example pro-social actions when we feel empathy or an attempt to repair damage in the event of guilt.

To sum up, moral emotions as affective states are activated in social situations. They accompany the assessment of behaviour in general terms: good, bad, duty/no duty, right/wrong. Emotional evaluation of behaviour or a social state of affairs takes a verbalised form, using concepts characterised by emotional meanings, acceptance or rejection can be expressed through a facial expression or tone of voice.

Recognising moral emotions and their role in moral processes does not mean that modern moral psychology accepts Hume's claim that reason is and should be a slave to feelings. At the same time, this point of view differs fundamentally from Kant's rationalism, according to which reason directly affects the will (Lewis, 2005). We only, or maybe even recognise that reason affects our will, evoking moral emotions, and moral emotions affect judgement and moral actions.

## 3. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR PEDAGOGY AND UPBRINGING PRACTICE

The analysis of theories, concepts and research presented above supports the assumption of the common belief that our moral experiences are linked to emotions. The disgust, indignation, joy, admiration we feel when attending or observing morally charged situations affect the assessments and judgements we make. The presence of emotions does not always help in recognising good and evil. Especially without the support of critical reflection, emotions can interfere with moral cognition. If the source of emotions is our egoism or low self-esteem, it is not the specific features of the situation that will determine the assessment and possible actions, but emotions such as anger, shame or fascination, which may distort the perception and assessment of the situation. It does not mean that emotions do not play a significant and positive role in moral cognition. It only means that it is necessary to develop specific attitudes and behaviours so that emotions support and do not interfere with the processes of perception, assessment and decision-making. An extreme but illustrative example of the importance of emotional maturity for evaluation and moral action is found in the behaviours of psychopaths and alexithymics, who can talk about what is right and wrong, conduct moral disputes, evaluate the behaviour of other people, but cannot apply moral principles in their lives. Emotional norms (cultural rules concerning emotions) also contain a normative message, i.e., what is considered desirable and what is unacceptable in a specific cultural context. On the other hand, moral values, by indicating what is good, right and fair, "suggest" how to behave emotionally, i.e., what we should feel and express in a specific situation (Lutz, 2012; Russel Hochschild, 2009). As emotions per se impart dynamics to thought and action, the emotion accompanying moral processes directs and amplifies appraisals and decisions – it evokes compelling or repulsion with regard to a specific attitude, situation and action (Ekman, 1999; Lazarus, 1999). Emotions are therefore an internal motivator of action; taking an external perspective, emotions make us credible as a subject of moral assessments and decisions, while we believe people who express emotions which are congruent with what they say and how they act (cf. Brzezińska, 2000; Trempała & Czyżowska, 2002).

The knowledge of in what situations and how to experience and express emotions, i.e., emotional knowledge (categorised by philosophers as practical knowledge) and the ability to apply this knowledge are not the same as knowing, understanding and applying moral values. At the same time, declaring or even acting in accordance with moral rules does not have to mean experiencing moral emotions – it may result from attachment to tradition, trained rituals or doctrine/religion/ideology to which we aspire. In situations of objectively difficult, borderline moral choices, decisions can be directed by egocentric motivation (Benhabib, 1986; Noddings, 1988).

Pedagogical thinking about moral emotions and their significance does not provide tools for interpreting the relationships between emotions and morality, but rather indicates the areas of pedagogical intervention as well as theoretical and methodological justifications. If moral emotions develop in contact with explicit and implicit social norms which shape individual beliefs and attitudes (Nichols, 2002b), while contextual elements combining moral norms and emotions are largely shaped by participation in culture, then the processes of upbringing are essential in moral development (Ehrlich, 2000). Usually, when talking about the need for moral education, we refer to a specific moral order and a selected psychological theory of the subject pursuing this moral order and to his or her moral development (Łobocki, 2005). The concept of moral emotions and indication of their role in the process of evaluation and moral action creates a different psychological (theoretical) context for moral upbringing. In other words, the concepts of moral emotions and, more broadly, emotivist theories adopted for descriptive purposes do not define the normative aspects of morality. We can treat them as ground-laying premises concerning moral development, and these, on the other hand, point to the developmental moments modify the adopted goals of education and possible methods of moral education (Brzezińska, 2000, p. 63). Therefore, if moral education, according to Mieczysław Łobocki:

"aims in particular at the moral development of children and young people, including in particular the transfer of knowledge about moral problems to them and the development of their ability to recognise what is morally wrong, inequitable or even despicable. It teaches moral sensitivity and readiness to act in a moral way" (Łobocki, 2005, p. 269), the development of moral emotions is an integral part of this process, both at the stage of moral evaluation and moral action motivated, among others, by empathy, sensitivity and understanding of the situation, also from the perspective of other people (Haidt, 2006: Hoffman, 2007; Prinz, 2006).

Emotions play a crucial role in the process of upbringing and education, regardless of what aspects of human development we intend to influence. Carol Gilligan (2003) and Richard Lazarus (1999) relate emotional development directly to the development of moral orientation. Wincenty Okoń (2009) includes emotional education in the domain of social and moral upbringing (2010). Władysław Zaczyński emphasises the importance of experiential components in education and development (1990). In the Polish research on moral feelings, Leon Petrażycki (after Tochowicz, 1990) was one of the first scientists to connect emotions and their development with the development of ethical behaviour and abiding by the law.

By maintaining the approach dichotomising thinking and emotions mentioned at the beginning of the article, it is possible to indicate meaningfully separate boundaries and goals of moral education. In the cognitive-developmental approach to morality, the purpose of education will be the development of logical thinking (Kohlberg & Mayer 2000, p. 54), in behaviourism – the exercise of discipline, obedience and habits, in the emotionist theories – the development of empathy, compassion and sensitivity (Hoffman, 2006), as well as moral emotions – self-awareness and readiness to experience shame, disgust or anger (Prinz, 2007). According to Steven L. Gordon – a supporter of social constructivism – emotional development consists in learning the ability to read emotional messages accurately in the contexts resulting from the role (1990). Carolyn Saarni (2005) describes competence as a set of abilities, knowledge and skills which enable self-regulation and interpersonal exchange, including the recognition of one's own and others' emotions on the basis of culturally defined indicators (e.g., body language, facial expression, language), as well as the ability to name emotions or explain their complexity, causes and effects. Such a perspective locates the development of morality in the area of character, attitudes and non-cognitive skills. Paraphrasing the words of Gregory Pence, since ethics concerns how we should live and since these areas are so much concerned with how we live, moral education ought to focus on the development of moral skills (virtues), thanks to which children and adolescents will be prepared to distinguish between good and evil and will be guided by moral feelings (Pence, 2015, p. 301). Knowledge of abstract concepts, doctrinal assumptions and logical justification of one's actions is of secondary significance. Hence, we put forward a thesis whereby moral education implies emotional education, and vice versa.

Without advocating, at least in this text, a specific system of values and ideology of moral education, moral emotions, both non-epistemic and epistemic ones, should constitute the goal and the means of education. The uniqueness of emotions and their key importance for understanding developmental processes stem precisely from this dual role of emotions, which, according to Saarnia, are both a transmitter and a socialising message (2005, p. 397). We agree with Robert Solomon, who argues that emotions are the basis of a good life and good choices and when they are "well" experienced, they help in establishing and maintaining bonds and relationships, making valuable decisions and making accurate judgements, including moral ones (Michalik-Jeżowska, 2013). This broad role of emotions makes them indispensable elements of the upbringing process. In traditional cultures, using an adaptive, transmissive model of upbringing, emotions played a role in the process of upbringing, but only as repressive social control – using shame and fear, inciting a sense of inferiority, reference to a sense of threat are probably generalised experiences of many generations (cf. Przybylska, 2022). It is not such emotions that should be present in the process of upbringing, especially in such an important field as morality.

Going further, the transfer of knowledge about values is not moral education either but experiencing values – an experience which is cognitive and emotional. Developing subjectivity, a sense of separateness and emotional reflexivity in the pupils is the core of bringing up a person who is the subject of thinking and action and is not the executor of the recommendations of any power or force. Socialisation transfer, which ensures the continuity of rules and meanings, always comes from a specific cultural context, primarily from the microculture of the family, i.e., the environment closest to the child, in which they learn about the expectations and beliefs important in the culture in which the grow up (Lutz, 2012; Zeidner, 2008).

If we recognise the importance of emotions in moral development, we should also ensure the conditions which are favourable to the development of emotional competence in school education. Emotional competence, which enables understanding, participation and self-creation within culture, develops around various forms of social activities, and the emotional system, as well as the moral one indirectly present in the symbolic layer of culture, is revealed in emotional exchanges. For this reason, interpersonal relationships and communication are indispensable for the socialisation of emotions and moral values (cf. Noddings, 1988; Przybylska, 2018; Russel Hochschild, 2009). Moral and emotional education could be implemented if school provided space for experiencing the practice of emotions and values. Teachers, educators, and students would need to be able to form meaningful bonds, pursuing dialogue, be engaged, and responsible (Nodding, 1988, p. 215).

Knowledge of complex emotions, emotional skills such as recognising and naming one's own and other people's emotions, emotional control and the ability to profit from emotional knowledge in thinking, acting and making decisions, as well as the development of emotional and cognitive aspects of empathy, form a conglomerate called emotional competence, which is crucial for the development of human agency (cf. Saarni, 2005). We should nurture these skills, also because of their significance for intrapersonal and interpersonal functioning. If we do not want good and evil to remain abstract concepts that we read about in wise discourses, education enabling one to be a morally conscious member of the community must be fully oriented towards human agency and focused on shaping attitudes and readiness to act in accordance with the adopted system of values. Thinking and experiencing integrated in emotional competence becomes the only way to make moral choices, preceded by moral judgement. In a metatheoretical perspective, we should be talking about upbringing in terms of emancipatory ideology, not a transmissive one (Kohlberg & Mayer, 2000).

The outlined context of moral education creates room for discussion on the practice of upbringing. It is worth considering the goals of moral education, including knowledge and emotional skills, as well as developing methodical solutions that will integrate education in the intellectual, emotional and moral aspects. What we know for sure, in order for education to be significant, it should focus on the person and develop personal predispositions. Unfortunately, it is not enough to list these goals in school educational programs, because the conditions necessary for education in the moral and emotional sphere include durability of the educational relationship, continuity of interaction and a favourable emotional climate in the classroom, in which social training takes place in a natural manner through participation (cf. Przybylska, 2018). Assuming that moral education involves the transfer of knowledge about values and the development of moral skills, it is very important to use problematic methods, including case studies, discussion and drama methods, thanks to which we achieve commitment, displaying personal attitude and launch the stage of information processing. As always, when we think about the effectiveness of upbringing, the question arises of what the education of educators and teachers should be like if it is they who should support emotional and moral development. We treat the questions formulated here as a starting point for further research on the meaning of emotions and the search for methods of pedagogical work helpful for holistic human development, also in the emotional and moral sphere.

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Мета статті – визначити місце емоцій у процесах формування суджень і прийняття моральних рішень, а також показати значущість емоційної компетентності для морального розвитку людини. У першій частині тексту ми розглядаємо концепцію моралі, приділяючи особливу увагу емотивізму Альфреда Д. Айєра, емотивізму Алана Гіббарда та тенденціям в етиці піклування Нел Ноддінгс як позиціям, що акцентують увагу на афективному факторі. У другій частині, використовуючи поняття соціального, пов'язаного з самосвідомістю і моральними емоціями, ми доводимо значення емоцій у процесах, що мають моральну цінність. Виходячи з цього, ми припускаємо, що люди, які розвинули високу емоційну компетентність, є також більш морально компетентними. Остання частина – це пошук педагогічних імплікацій та обґрунтування тези про змістовний і функціональний взаємозв'язок емоційного та морального розвитку в процесах виховання. Оскільки етика стосується того, як ми повинні жити, і оскільки ці сфери так сильно пов'язані з тим, як ми живемо, моральне виховання має бути спрямоване на розвиток моральних навичок (чеснот), завдяки яким моральні почуття будуть спрямовувати дітей і підлітків.

**Ключові слова:** емоції, емоційна компетентність, моральні емоції, моральне виховання.